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DAMAGES
MARSHALL T. MAYS*
During the period of this survey, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court handed down a number of decisions touching on
the subject of damages. With one exception, these cases re-
affirm established principles of law in this State. The excep-
tion is the case of Jackson v. Banks Construction Company.1
The Jackson case involved personal injuries sustained in
an automobile accident. The plaintiff in a previous action,
against another defendant growing out of another automobile
accident, had recovered $29,000.00 for severe and permanent
injuries. The defendant in the instant case attempted by
proper allegation to introduce evidence of the previous action
and the amount of the recovery therein. On motion of the
plaintiff, the lower court struck from the answer references
to the previous action and the amount of the recovery. On
appeal; the Supreme Court held that the allegations as to
the previous injury of the plaintiff were relevant, and that
the Court was not required to dissect the paragraph of the
answer so as to separate those allegations germaine to the
issues from those that were not, and that the lower court
would have been justified in refusing the motion to strike,
but that the latter question was not raised on the appeal.
The Court further held that the defendant was entitled to
show fully the nature and extent of the injuries received by
the plaintiff in the previous accident, but that the amount re-
covered by the plaintiff in a previous action was irrelevant.
This appears to be a point of first impression in South
Carolina, and in deciding this question, the Court cites de-
cisions of the Appellate Courts of Massachusetts and Texas.
In Scott v. Southern Railway Company,2 the Court held
that a verdict of $1,640.00 for damages to the plaintiff's auto-
mobile was not excessive. The Court further held that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover for the loss of use of his
automobile at the rate of $5.00 per day, that being the rental
value of an automobile in this area, although the automobile
*Member of the firm of Mays & Mays, Greenwood, S. C.
1. 229 S. C. 461, 93 S. E. 2d 604 (1956).
2. 231 S. C. 28, 97 S. E. 2d 73 (1957).
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was furnished to the plaintiff without charge by a third
party.
In another railway crossing case, Barnett v. Charleston and
Western Carolina Railway Company,3 the defendant moved
to strike the plaintiff's testimony that he had paid $986.00
for the repairs to his truck, because the defendant had no
opportunity to cross-examine the man who made the repairs,
and because there was no evidence to show what the truck was
worth before or after it was damaged. In sustaining the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Court quoted from
Coleman v. Levkoff, 4 as follows:
'In any view of the measure of damages, the cost of
repairing the injured machine was directly relevant.
The condition of the machine after the injury, from the
viewpoint of what would be required to repair it, was a
matter clearly within the scope of the inquiry.'
Further citing the Coleman case, the Court said:
'The general rule is that the owner of personal prop-
erty injured by the negligence of another, is entitled to
recover the difference between the market value of the
property immediately before the injury and its market
value immediately after the injury. * * * But it is the
duty of the owner of property injured by the negligence
of another to use all reasonable effort to minimize the
damage. * * * If in the discharge of that duty the owner
has the property repaired and restored to a condition
in which its market value equals or exceeds the market
value before the injury, the measure of damages in that
case is the reasonable cost of restoring the property to its
previous condition, together with the value of the use of
the property during the time reasonably required to re-
pair it.'
The case of Bessinger v. deLoach& was an action by a patient.
against a dentist for malpractices in which the lower court
directed a verdict for the defendant. The evidence developed
a controversy between the defendant dentist and the physician
who subsequently treated the plaintiff. The dentist and his
witnesses contended that the treatment by the physician
aggravated the plaintiff's condition. In remanding the case
for a new trial, the Court said:
3. 230 S. C. 525, 96 S. E. 2d 555 (1957).
4. 128 S. C. 487, 122 S. E. 875, 876 (1924).
5. 230 S. C. 1, 94 S. E. 2d 3 (1956).
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The following principle may come into play upon
re-trial: 'The general rule is that if an injured person
uses ordinary care in selecting a physician for treatment
of his injury, the law regards the aggravation of the
injury resulting from the negligent act of the physician
as a part of the immediate and direct damages which
naturally flow from the original in injury.'
The case of Taylor v. United States Casualty Company
G
involved an action for breach of contract of automobile lia-
bility insurance. The Court held:
We do not agree with appellant's (defendant's) con-
clusion that an absence of proof of fraudulent act ac-
companying the breach of contract entitled appellant to
a directed verdict. Such failure of proof affected only
respondent's right to punitive damages. * * * And
whatever error there may have been on the part of the
trial judge in submitting the issue of punitive damages
to the jury was rendered harmless by the verdict which
was for actual damages only.
The case of Butler v. Schilletter7 was an action by a pur-
chaser for specific performance of a contract to sell real
estate and for damages. The defendant moved to require
the plaintiff to elect whether to proceed on the equity side
of the court in specific performance, or on the law side of
the court for damages. The Court denied the motion and held
that while general damages could not be recovered in an action
in specific performance, special damages could be recovered,
and quoted Taylor v. Highland Park Corporation8 as follows:
'A Court of Equity when it acquires jurisdiction in a
claim made for specific performance, can retain juris-
diction and adjudicate all of the legal rights of the parties
to the suit in conformity with justice, equity, and good
conscience.'
Two cases decided during the period of the survey in-
volved breach of warranty. Cannon v. Pulliam Motor Com-
pany, et al.9 involved a breach of manufacturer's automobile
parts warranty. Spartanburg Hotel Corporation v. Alexander
Smith, Inc.'0 involved the breach of an express oral warranty
6. 229 S. C. 230, 92 S. E. 2d 647 (1956).
7. 230 S. C. 552, 96 S. E. 2d 661 (1957).
3. 210 S. C. 254, 42 S. E. 2d 335, 339 (1947).
9. 230 S. C. 131, 94 S. E. 2d 397 (1956).
10. 231 S. C. 1, 97 S. E. 2d 199 (1957).
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as to the quality and fitness of carpeting sold to the hotel.
In both cases, the Court followed the established rule that the
proper measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference between the actual value of the product in its de-
fective condition at the time of sale and its value if it had
been as warranted. The Court further held in the automobile
case, that there were no circumstances warranting the recov-
ery of special damages. In the carpet case, the Court held
that interest should not be allowed because the damages re-
coverable for breach of warranty were unliquidated and were
not ascertainable by mere computation.
The case of United States Rubber Company v. White Tire
Company, Inc. et al.11 involved the determination, in a receiv-
ership proceeding, of damages for breach of a contract for
lease of real estate. The Court reaffirmed the established rule
as to the measure of damages, saying:
The measure of such damages is the amount that
she would have received as rent for the remainder of the
term had there been no default, less such amount as she
may receive from the new tenant, for it was her duty to
minimize her damages.
11. 231 S. C. 84, 97 S. E. 2d 403 (1956).
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